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Abstract 
The paper argues that the traditional difficulty encountered in finding evidence on the 
effects of credit availability on economic activity depends on the fact that these effects are 
powerful but rare and vary with the cycle. The global financial crisis offers an opportunity to 
test this assumption. The paper exploits a unique dataset, including direct information on 
credit rationing for 1,200 Italian firms over the last twenty years. We find that the elasticity 
of a firm’s investment to the availability of bank credit has been significant in periods of 
economic contraction, but not in other periods; that the ability to tap alternative sources of 
finance is crucial to this result; that during the global crisis the impact of credit constraints 
on Italian investment in manufacturing was significant.   
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1. Introduction
1 
How much did credit market distress, and in particular the reduction in the availability 
of  bank  loans,  contribute  to  the  transmission  of  the  2008-09  global  crisis  to  the  Italian 
economy?  The  answer  to  this  question  remains  surprisingly  controversial.  A  substantial 
empirical literature finds support for the role of supply restrictions in explaining the dramatic 
deceleration  in  credit  flows  that  took  place  immediately  after  the  collapse  of  Lehman 
Brothers in mid-September 2008;
2 so far, however, attempts to estimate directly the effects 
of credit restrictions on the real economy are more limited. 
The question has roots in the long-standing debate on the respective roles of bank 
interest  rates  and  credit  quantities  in  explaining  variations  in  investment  and  economic 
activity. In most mainstream models, real interest rates are the only transmission channel 
from the financial sector to the real economy; there is a huge amount of empirical evidence 
on their effects. However, since the contribution by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), it has been 
argued that it is the quantity of loans, not just the interest rate charged, that is critical in 
explaining economic fluctuations at certain times. Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003) draw major 
implications from this conjecture for both monetary and regulatory policy, calling for a shift 
in focus from money to credit and for a renewed attention to regulatory instruments and tools 
for liquidity support.  
The issue, however, has remained controversial and the empirical evidence has proven 
to  be  elusive.  In  euro-area  countries,  the  extensive  study  on  monetary  transmission 
conducted by the Eurosystem (Angeloni, Kahsyap and Mojon, 2003) finds strong support for 
the role of bank interest rates, but reaches mixed conclusions on an active role of bank 
balance-sheet aggregates. 
There are at least two serious obstacles to a satisfactory empirical assessment of the 
effect  of  credit  availability  on  activity.  The  first,  and  better  known,  is  the  difficultly  of 
                                                           
1 I thank Paolo Angelini, Giuseppe Fiori, Domenico Marchetti, Fabio Panetta, Giuseppe Parigi, Carmelo 
Salleo, Stefano Siviero and two anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions of this paper. The usual 
disclaimer applies. 
2 For Italy, Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010); Del Giovane, Eramo and Nobili (2009); De Mitri, Gobbi and 
Sette (2009); Panetta and Signoretti (2010); for the euro area, Ciccarelli, Maddaloni and Peydrò (2009); for 
Germany, Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2009).     6 
identifying the role of credit supply and credit demand in explaining the behaviour of credit, 
and particularly in interpreting the positive correlation between bank lending and economic 
activity: while a substantial amount of evidence indicates that banking crises are closely 
correlated to a sharp drop in economic activity, the causal direction remains uncertain.
3  
The empirical literature on the “credit channel” has tried to address the “supply-versus-
demand” puzzle underlying the timing patterns of output and bank loans by seeking suitable 
instruments  in  several  ways:  looking  at  the  behaviour  of  non-bank  forms  of  credit; 
comparing the behaviour of small and large firms; looking at yield spreads on loans or loan 
substitutes  (Bernanke,  1993);  looking  at  the  effect  of  cash  flow  on  investment  (Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen, 1998). Many of these approaches remain controversial.
4 A possibly 
more robust way to proceed is to exploit direct information on the identification of credit 
supply versus credit demand, based on qualitative measures of limits to credit availability 
obtained either from surveys among banks
5 or from surveys among firms.
6 Still, the effect of 
these proxies is often found to be non significant (for Italy, Guiso and Parigi, 1999 and 
Bontempi, Golinelli and Parigi, 2010).  
A second obstacle, however, less frequently addressed by the empirical literature, is 
that the effects of credit quantity restrictions on the economy are likely to be variable over 
time. This is a central, although often overlooked, tenet both of historical narratives and of 
the  literature  on  the  credit  channel.  Bordo  and  Haubrich  (2009),  taking  a  historical 
perspective, argue that credit market distress has its most extreme effects in a business cycle 
downturn. In their seminal contribution, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) stress that 
the dynamics of the credit cycle are essentially non-linear: financial accelerator effects are 
stronger, the deeper in recession is the economy.  
This may be due to a number of reasons. The real effects of bank lending depend on 
the agency costs of investment faced by a firm, which are negligible at times when profits 
and the share of internal finance are large, when uncertainty about the future – and therefore 
information asymmetries – is perceived to be low, when alternative sources of financing 
                                                           
3 For a recent survey of the evidence on the effects of bank crises, see Carpinelli (2009). 
4 E.g. the interpretation of the cash-flow sensitivity of investment was questioned by Kaplan and Zingales 
(2000). 
5 E.g. see Lown and Morgan (2006). 
6 E.g. Duca and Rosenthal, 1993; Angelini and Generale, 2008; Bontempi, Golinelli and Parigi, 2010.     7 
(other  banks,  non-bank  intermediaries,  bond  markets  or  heavier  recourse  to  commercial 
credit) are easier to find;
 7 by contrast, the premium on bank finance can increase rapidly 
when  cash  flows  dry  up,  uncertainty  increases,  and  non-bank  financial  flows  fall,  as  is 
typically the case during a contraction.  
The assumption that the credit channel operates in a non-linear way, depending on the 
state  of  the  economy,  has  not  frequently  been  tested;  however,  the  existence  of  non-
linearities may easily explain why both time series estimates and short panels are a poor tool 
to  make  a  robust  empirical  assessment  of  the  effects  of  credit  restrictions  on  economic 
activity. Since credit distress is a rare, if powerful, event, the full effect of the financial 
accelerator can only be gauged by comparing relatively rare recession episodes with normal 
behaviour. 
The global financial crisis offers an opportunity to test the assumption that the effects 
of credit availability on the economy are state-dependent and to get a better estimate of their 
quantitative importance.  
This paper addresses the issue from the vantage point of a unique dataset: a panel 
which includes individual information on planned and actual investment for about 1,200 
Italian manufacturing firms, covering twenty years of data and including direct information 
on whether firms are credit rationed.  
Two features of our data are important for our purposes. First, the dataset includes a 
firm-specific direct measure of credit restrictions, which makes it possible to distinguish 
between credit demand and credit supply factors (the sample also contains information on 
the determinants of investment decisions that can be used as control variables, minimising 
the risk of spurious correlations). Second, its panel dimension, which covers a large number 
of firms but also a long period of time, makes it possible to test the hypothesis that the 
impact of credit constraints on investment behaviour is time-varying and that the estimated 
effect depends on the phase of the economic cycle (the cross-section dimension is large 
enough to estimate time-varying parameters, while the time dimension is also long enough to 
include four episodes of recession). 
                                                           
7 De Blasio (2005) finds evidence that Italian firms substitute trade credit for bank credit in inventory 
financing during periods of monetary tightening.     8 
Our analysis is divided into three parts. First, we test the effects of credit rationing on 
investment using our panel; we ask whether these effects are time-varying; we ask how they 
depend on the state of the economy, measured by the official contraction periods identified 
by ISAE. We compare the results with those from the existing studies that do not allow the 
effects to vary with the cycle. 
Then,  we  ask  whether  the  variations  in  a  firm’s  investment  sensitivity  to  the 
availability  of  bank  credit  may  be  explained  by  the  ability  to  tap  alternative  sources  of 
finance, which dry up during recessions. To this end, we replicate the previous analysis 
separately for firms that do or do not have access to non-bank sources of finance, using 
membership of an industrial group as a proxy: we expect investment sensitivity to credit to 
be always large for the latter, but to show a more pronounced cyclical pattern for the former.  
Finally, we turn to a more specific assessment of the role of credit availability in the 
global  recession,  concentrating  on  the  years  2008-09,  exploiting  additional  specific 
information that is available for that episode. As mentioned, although there is broad evidence 
for the existence of credit supply restrictions in the global crisis, their contribution to the 
slowdown is still open to discussion. For Italy, a few estimates have been conducted at the 
macro level, but they are still tentative and rest on strong assumptions. The  benchmark 
macroeconomic result – to our knowledge, so far the only one – is provided by Caivano, 
Rodano and Siviero (2010). On the basis of the simulations of the Bank of Italy Quarterly 
Model (BIQM), they argue that in Italy the Great Recession was transmitted mostly through 
the effect of the sudden stop in international trade on export activity, rather than through 
financial factors, but also that the latter made a non-negligible contribution.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the basic regressions. Section 3 
discusses the data definitions and their sources. Section 4.1 presents the main results of the 
panel estimation. Section 4.2 extends the analysis, studying the different sensitivity to bank 
credit availability in firms that have easier access to other sources of finance. Then, as an 
additional  piece  of  analysis,  Section  4.3  concentrates  on  the  global  crisis.  Section  5 
concludes.     9 
2. Empirical strategy 
There is a large literature on the effect of credit constraints on investment, following 
Jaffe and Modigliani (1969), Jaffee and Russell (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
8 In a 
frictionless, full information world, notional investment plans should only depend on the 
cost  of  capital  and  expected  profits,  and  not  on  the  firm’s  liquidity  or  access  to  credit. 
However, in the real world the actual implementation of investment plans can be hindered by 
liquidity and credit constraints, due to the pervasiveness of information asymmetries, market 
incompleteness and market segmentations.  
As mentioned in the introduction, the empirical research on the link between credit 
quantities and investment suffers from substantial identification problems. The approach we 
follow here is to exploit direct qualitative information, on the firm’s side, on whether their 
credit applications have been turned down, and to introduce this measure in an investment 
equation.   
Direct measures of financial constraints obtained from surveys of  firms have been 
widely used as a dependent variable in the literature studying the determinants of credit 
rationing (Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferri, 1998; Guiso, 1998; Duca and Rosenthal, 1993), as 
well as in the “finance and growth” literature (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002; 
Angelini and Generale, 2008); they have been used less frequently as an explanatory variable 
to assess the impact of credit availability on investment. As mentioned, exceptions, in the 
Italian case, are Guiso and Parigi (1999) and Bontempi, Golinelli and Parigi (2010), who 
explicitly  consider  a  survey-based  measure  of  credit  availability  among  investment 
determinants. Nonetheless, they fail to find a statistically significant effect. 
To improve upon this literature, we exploit the availability of separate information on 
investment plans for the future and on actual investment carried out by the firm. Such a 
distinction  may  help  to  improve  the  precision  of  the  estimates  vis-à-vis  the  previous 
literature: comparing current investment to previous plans may be a better benchmark to pin 
down the effect of liquidity constraints on actual expenditure.  
                                                           
8 For a review of the various motivations and definitions of credit rationing, see Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990).     10 
The empirical strategy is therefore based on two base regressions (ex-ante and ex-
post):
9 
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where i stands for the firm, Ii,t is investment in year t, I
Plan
i,t+1|t is investment plans for 
year t+1 formulated in year t, CFi,t is cash-flow, Si,t is a firm’s nominal sales,  t t i y | 1 , + &  is a 
firm’s expected change in sales in real terms, si,t is a measure of a firm’s uncertainty about 
its sales prospects, pi,t is an index of the firm’s current profits, CUi,t is the current degree of 
the  firm’s  capacity  utilisation,  Xj  are  additional  qualitative  variables  on  the  motives  for 
revising investment, and RATi,t is a dummy which takes value 1 when the firm is credit 
rationed; the latter is the key variable in the exercise. Individual fixed effects si and time 
fixed effects dt are included. Some specifications also include sector-specific (either 2- or 3-
digit) and province-specific time effects as controls.  
The foundations of (1) are fairly standard.
10 Cash flow and profits enter as either a 
measure of the expected return to investment or as a measure of the firm’s available internal 
resources. Expected growth in real sales and capacity utilisation are alternative indicators of 
demand. Guiso and Parigi (1999) and Bontempi, Golinelli and Parigi (2010) discuss the 
inclusion of a measure of uncertainty in the investment equation, whose sign is uncertain a 
priori but found by them to be negative. We use sales St-1, as a scaling variable.
11 
In equation (2), the dependent variable is instead the percentage deviation of current 
investment from the previous year’s plans. We assume that the extent of the divergence 
between planned and actual investment depends on realisations of variables that were not 
known at the time (t-1) when the expectations entering equation (1) were set: cash flow, real 
sales growth, the current degree of capacity utilisation, profits. The proposed formulation 
                                                           
9  For an early approach along these lines, see Eisner (1978), who separately estimates regressions for 
anticipated capital expenditures and actual realisations. 
10 E.g., see the references in Gaiotti and Generale, 2002. 
11The  capital  stock  is  not  available  in  our  dataset.  Implicitly,  the  level  of  capital  stock  still  affects 
     11 
includes  actual  realisations,  rather  than  the  difference  between  actual  realisations  and 
previous expectations; the reason is that expectations are either not available or (as in the 
case of CFi,t+1|t and  t t i y | 1 , + & ) are only available for a short sub-sample. As Eisner (1978) notes, 
it is often the case that empirically, in investment equations like (2), actual realisations are a 
good proxy for – or perform better than – surprises.
12 A set of qualitative dummies (Xj) 
controls for additional motives for investment revisions (a description is in the next section). 
The variable RAT takes the value 1 in a period when the firm is credit rationed, 0 
otherwise. In equation (1) the current value of RATt may be considered a proxy for the 
unobservable  expectation  of  being  rationed  in  the  next  period  (RATt+1|t),  when  the 
investment outlays are due.    
Our  exercise  focuses,  first,  on  the  estimation  of  coefficients  a6  and  b5;  they  are 
expected to be negative under the hypothesis that credit constraints affect investment. Then, 
to test whether the effects of RAT on investment realisations are time-varying and whether 
they depend on the state of the economic cycle, RAT is then interacted with time dummies or 
with variables indicating the position of the economy in the cycle based on the ISAE-ISCO 
dating, as discussed below. The specification for equation (2) is modified as follows: 
(3)  
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where CONTRACTION is a dummy taking the value 1 in the years of contraction. 
Coefficient b5a is expected to be negative and larger in absolute value than b5b. 
3. Data 
The Survey of Italian Manufacturing Firms (SIM), run annually by the Bank of Italy,  
is  an  open  panel  of  about  1,200  firms  per  year,  which  since  1978  collects  specific 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
investment in the equation via the degree of capacity utilisation CUi,t. 
12 As an explanation, Eisner (1978) quotes possible inaccuracy in the expectation variables measured and a 
tendency for agents to expect that tomorrow will be like today.     12 
information  on  individual  Italian  manufacturing  firms  with  at  least  50  employees.
13  It 
includes firm-level information on investment and qualitative information on the difficulties 
in obtaining credit. The sample is broadly representative of the industry composition of the 
Italian economy, although it tends to be biased towards larger firms. If anything, this feature 
of the sample should reinforce any result finding a significant effect of credit rationing on 
investment.
14  
Data are collected at the beginning of each year, relative to the previous year, by 
interviewing a sample of firms, stratified according to sector (two-digit classification of the 
Italian  National  Institute  of  Statistics),  size  (number  of  employees),  and  geographical 
location (region). Data revision is carried out by officials of the Bank of Italy. A special 
effort is made to keep information as closely comparable as possible in subsequent years. 
The SIM includes annual information on the investment planned by the firm in year t 
for year t+1 and on current investment plans (both in euros), as well as on current and past 
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(1) and (2) above.
15  
The SIM includes also the past, current and – for a small sub-sample – expected degree 
of  capacity  utilisation  (CUt-1,  CUt,  CUt+1|t).  Since  1996  the  survey  also  includes:  the 
expected change in real sales ( t t i y | 1 , + & ); an index of the current profitability of the firm (pt);
16 a 
minimum and a maximum value around the expected change in sales, which we use to derive 
                                                           
13 Service firms and smaller industrial firms were only recently included in the survey, currently known as 
the Survey of Industrial and Service Firms. See http://www.bancaditalia.it/statistiche/indcamp/indimpser; they 
are not considered in this paper. Each year about 15-20% of firms are dropped from the sample due to attrition, 
and are replaced by firms with comparable characteristics (the average stay of a firm in the sample is around 
five years). 
14 The under-representation of small firms introduces a bias against finding a strong impact of lending 
constraints on investment, since the smaller firms are those for which the bank credit restrictions should be 
more binding in terms of investment plans, along the lines of the financial accelerator hypothesis.  
15 In both cases, observations below the 5
th and above the 95
th percentile were discarded. For the second 
variable, we also discard responses in which I  i,t is not consistent across two successive surveys (each year 
firms are asked to report the current and the previous year’s investment).   
16 Firms may define the situation of their current profits in five ways (large loss, small loss, no extra profit, 
small extra profit, large extra profit), which we rank from 1 to 5 to construct the index.      13 
the measure of uncertainty as the width of this range (st).
17 Moreover, since 2003 the survey 
includes the value of the firm’s past, current and expected cash flow (CFt-1, CFt, CFt+1|t).  
When investment is different from the plans that were communicated in the previous 
survey, the firms are asked to indicate the reasons. Among the admissible answers, they may 
indicate a change in the cost of production of investment goods; a change in the delivery 
time of the investment goods; a change in cash flow; or an internal reorganisation of the 
firm. We use these answers to construct the control variables Xj;i,t in equation (2). For each 
possible motive, we include two dummies, the first taking the value 1 when that motive 
contributes to an upward revision of investment, the second taking the value 1 when that 
motive contributes to a downward revision of investment.   
Measuring  quantity  credit  restrictions  is  key  to  our  exercise.  Following  a  standard 
approach  in  the  literature,
18  we  consider  a  firm  to  be  credit  rationed,  depending  on  the 
answers to three questions included in the SIM since 1988: i) if the firm would like to 
receive more credit at current conditions; ii) if it approached an intermediary but was denied 
credit; and  iii) if it would be ready to accept tighter conditions. Our preferred definition 
(RAT) includes the firms that answered “yes” to questions i) and ii), a definition which we 
consider to be a reasonable compromise between being tight enough, but also covering a 
sufficiently large portion of firms in the sample. As a robustness check, we also consider a 
looser definition (RAT_LOOSE), including the firms who answered “yes” to question i), and 
a stricter definition (RAT_STRICT), including the firms who answered “yes” to all three 
questions.
  
Our  complete  sample  covers  the  period  1988-2009;  it  includes  around  22,000 
observations for the ex post definition of investment in equation (2) and 27,000 observations 
for the ex ante definition in equation (1).
19  
The  sample  includes  four  contractions,  defined  as  the  period  from  peak  to  trough 
reported in the ISAE-ISCO dating. The contraction periods are 1992-93, 1995-96, 2000-03, 
                                                           
17 Bontempi, Golinelli and Parigi (2010) follow a similar approach. Guiso and Parigi (1999), in a cross 
section, exploit detailed information on the probability distribution, only included in the SIM in 1993. 
18 See Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferri (1998) and Angelini and Generale (2008).  
19 Available data for the ex post definition start in 1989.     14 
2008-09;
20 out of 22 years included in the sample, 9 are therefore classified as contraction 
years. 
The main statistics are reported in Table 1. The dynamics of investment and financial 
constraints are reported in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. 
Over the sample, in terms of median values, investment revisions are slightly negative 
(-3% of planned investment), while planned investment is around 2.9% of a firm’s sales. As 
shown in Fig. 1 (where contraction periods are indicated with shaded areas), both planned 
and actual investment (relative to total sales) fall deeply during the “Great Recession”, in 
2008-09. In the first year of the recession, the planned investment/sales ratio (dotted line) 
falls from 2.6% in 2007 to 1.7%; actual investment is somewhat below the previous year’s 
plans (2.3% of sales, against a plan of 3.5% the previous year). In the second year of the 
recession,  the  drop  in actual  investment  is  much  worse  (to  1.6%,  the  lowest  value  ever 
recorded in the sample), while investment plans remain on the very low levels reached the 
previous year. Over the whole period, the turning points in plans typically lead those in 
realisations. 
As for capacity utilisation (CAP_UTIL), firms on average report that they are using 
80% of their capacity, but the dispersion of this variable across time and firms is large (top 
panel of Table 1); considering the top and bottom decile, it ranges from 95% to 60%. On 
average, expected sales grow by 2.4% per year (EXP_D_OUTPUT); the range of uncertainty 
around this value (UNCERT) is on average equal to 6 percentage points, but in extreme cases 
it  can  rise  to  20  (9
th  decile).  Both  expected  and  current  cash  flow  (EXP_C_FLOW, 
C_FLOW) represent, on average, slightly more than 6% of total sales, with values across 
firms ranging from 0% to 15% (9
th decile). The mean and median values of the index for 
firms’ profitability (PROFIT) correspond to “no extra profits”. During recessions (data not 
shown)  typically  the  rate  of  capacity  utilisation,  sales  growth  and  profit  fall,  while 
uncertainty rises.
21 
                                                           
20 See ISAE, 2009, p. 54. The year 2009 was not yet taken into consideration there, but its interpretation as 
a contraction year is uncontroversial.  
21 In the 2008-09 episode, in the sample average capacity utilisation drops by almost 10 points, expected 
sales drops to -7.5% in 2008 , to recover the following year, the profit index moves into the “loss” region; the 
average uncertainty range increases to 11.5%.      15 
The fraction of credit-constrained firms (the share of firms for which, alternatively, 
RAT, RAT_LOOSE and RAT_STRICT is equal to 1) is reported in the lower panel of Table 1 
and in Fig. 2.  In normal times, only a relatively small fraction of firms declares itself to be 
credit-constrained: on average, around 4% according to the RAT definition, 3% according to 
the RAT_STRICT definition, and 11% according to the RAT_LOOSE definition.  Figure 2 
presents the time-series pattern of these variables. They all reach a peak in the two main 
recessions. RAT touches 11% in 1992-93, during the EMS crisis, and 8-9% in 2008-09, 
during the global recession. Not all contractions, however, look alike from this perspective: 
in the two other cases (1995-96 and 2000-03) the share of credit-constrained firms remains 
on relatively low levels (about 4%) and no clear peaks are apparent. 
A fully-fledged study of the determinants of credit constraints is beyond the purpose of 
this paper (on this, see Guiso, 1998; Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferri, 1998; Bianco, Ferri and 
Finaldi Russo, 1999). However, Table 1b compares the characteristics of the firms whose 
loan applications are turned down compared with the rest of the sample. They are typically 
smaller (the average number of employees is 340, compared with 570 for the whole sample); 
the expected growth of their sales is stronger (5.4% versus 3.9% for the whole sample), but 
the uncertainty surrounding their prospects is also greater (the min-max range for expected 
sales growth is 11.8%, versus 9% for the whole sample. Credit-constrained firms are also 
(slightly) less likely to be part of an industrial group and have lower profits and more idle 
capacity. By contrast, there are no appreciable differences in current and expected cash flow. 
These features may point to a role of information asymmetries or greater opaqueness in 
contributing to the refusal of a loan, but other explanations are also possible.
 22 
For the purposes of this paper, it is important that proper controls for profits, cash 
flow, capacity utilisation, growth and uncertainty, as well as firm-specific effects be included 
on the right-hand side of (1) and (2), to rule out the possibility of spurious correlations. 
                                                           
22 Some of these variables (size, uncertainty, group membership) clearly identify the classes of borrowers 
across which informational frictions are greatest (Guiso, 1998) and which are therefore more likely to be credit-
constrained  à  la  Stiglitz  and  Weiss  (1981).  Others  types  of  variables  may  be  more  consistent  with  other 
definitions of credit rationing, e.g. à la Jaffee and Modigliani (1969), where banks classify borrowing firms 
into small groups based on objective factors. A discussion of the different motives for credit rationing goes 
beyond the scope of this paper.        16 
4. Results 
4.1 The effects of credit rationing on investment 
We first turn to the estimation of equation 2. 
Table  2  presents  our  base  regression  results.  In  the  first  three  columns  we  show 
estimates with individual fixed effects, time fixed effects and with various combinations of 
the explanatory variables.
23 In comparing the results, one needs to consider that the sample 
period varies through the different specifications; while our preferred panel covers twenty 
years,  due  to  availability  constraints  the  inclusion  of  some  of  the  explanatory  variables 
(namely profit and cash flow) in the specification implies a substantial shortening of the 
sample length (down to sixteen, or even five, years).  
In the following two columns, sector-specific time effects (twenty-one 2-digit NACE 
sector dummies interacted with the time dummies) and province-specific time effects (95 
province dummies interacted with the time dummies) are also included, in order to control 
better for effects not captured by the right-hand-side variables. This is important to avoid the 
estimate of the coefficient on RAT being distorted by omitted variables which may affect 
both firms’ investment and banks’ credit supply. Finally, in the last two columns, RAT is 
replaced with the two alternative definitions of quantity credit restrictions (RAT_LOOSE, 
RAT_STRICT).  
Overall,  revisions  in  investment  plans  (INV_REV)  are  significantly  and  positively 
affected by the degree of capacity utilisation (CAP_UTIL) and by current profits (PROFIT). 
The  qualitative  dummies  on  the  determinants  of  investment  revisions  are  also  always 
significant  with  the  expected  sign  and  explain  a  large  proportion  of  the  variability  of 
investment. By contrast, the coefficient on cash flow (CFLOW) is not significantly different 
from zero.
24   
Quantity credit restrictions (RAT) turn out to have the expected, negative and usually 
                                                           
23 The expected change in sales ( y & ), which enters equation (2) above, was never statistically significant, 
possibly due in part to collinearity with capacity utilisation, and it is therefore not included in the regressions 
reported in the table.  
24 This may be a result either of the collinearity between cash flow and profits, or of the much shorter time 
horizon of the sample over which actual cash flow data are available.      17 
statistically  significant  effect  on  investment,  although  not  a  very  large  one;  on  average, 
rationed firms cut their investment plans by 5%-10%. The stricter definitions of quantity 
restrictions (RAT_STRICT) also perform well in the regression (seventh column), while the 
coefficient  on  the  looser  definition,  RAT_LOOSE,  is  not  significant  (sixth  column). 
However, the significance level of RAT drops when either the sample is shortened (third 
column) or when controls for province- or sector-specific time effects are included (fourth 
column). The finding only marginally improves upon the results by Guiso and Parigi (1999) 
and Bontempi, Golinelli and Parigi (2010). 
In a second set of regressions, we let the effect of RAT on investment vary through 
time by interacting it with the time dummies. The results are presented in Table 3. The first 
two columns report, respectively, the regression on the full sample and a regression on a 
shorter sample including the profit index among the explanatory variables; in the last two 
columns controls for province- and sector- specific time effects are added. 
Overall, the results strongly confirm the hypothesis that quantity credit restrictions 
affect investment in an economically significant way, but also that these effects are time-
varying. The assumption that all the coefficients on the interactions between RAT and the 
time dummies are the same is rejected.
25 In some periods, the coefficient on the RAT variable 
is largely negative and significant, as during the EMS exchange rate crisis (1992-93) and, 
more  recently,  during  the  global  financial  crisis  in  2008-09  (although  with  a  somewhat 
smaller  point  estimate).  In  other  years,  however,  the  coefficients  are  small  and  not 
significant. The variability of the coefficient on RAT across time may explain why, in the 
previous set of regressions the estimate of the average coefficient is small, only weakly 
significant, and not robust to the sample length. 
A more specific test that the effects of quantity credit restrictions are stronger when the 
economy is in a recession is conducted in Table 4.  We interact the RAT variable with a 
dummy indicating a contraction period as in equation (3) above. Two alternative interaction 
variables are considered: the first is a dummy taking the value 1 in the years of contraction 
(period from peak to trough: CONTRACTION); the second is a dummy that identifies only 
the first year after the peak (CONTRACTION_FIRST_YEAR), the latter under the hypothesis 
                                                           
25 For the regression in the first column of the table, the null hypothesis that all coefficients on RAT are 
equal is rejected with P-value=0.03 (not shown).     18 
that the effects of credit constraints on the revisions of investment plans are milder in the 
years following a recession than in the initial year.
26 As discussed above in commenting 
Figure 2, we consider the contraction years identified in the ISAE-ISCO dating, to which we 
add 2008-09.   
The first two columns in Table 4 present estimates of equation (3) using, alternatively, 
CONTRACTION or CONTRACTION_FIRST_YEAR in the interaction term; in the last two 
columns,  as  in  previous  tables,  the  two  regressions  are  re-estimated  adding  controls  for 
sector-specific and province-specific time effects.  
All  in  all,  during  contractions  the  elasticity  of  investment  realisations  to  the  RAT 
variable is large and very significant; a rationed firm reduces investment realisations by 
around 20% — up to 30% if one considers the first year of the contraction only. By contrast, 
the effect of credit restrictions is nil in the other periods. The results are remarkably robust to 
sector and province controls. 
By contrast, credit restrictions seem to have less effect on ex-ante investment plans. 
The results of the estimation of equation (1) are shown in Table 5. As in the previous table, 
the first three columns show estimates with individual fixed effects and time fixed effects; in 
the fourth and fifth column, sector-specific time effects are included; in the sixth column, 
province-specific time effects are included.  
Overall, the fit of the equation and the sign of the various coefficients is relatively 
good. The various regressors all have the expected sign and are significant. Investment plans 
(INV_PLAN)  respond  positively  to  capacity  utilisation,  to  expected  sales  growth 
(EXP_D_OUTPUT), to expected cash flow (EXP_D_CFLOW), and to the profit index. They 
also respond negatively to our measure of sales uncertainty (UNCERT), but in this case the 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero. The coefficients retain their significance 
even when sector- and province-specific time effects are included.  
However,  although  the  sign  on  the  RAT  variable  is  negative  as  expected,  the 
confidence interval is large. The coefficient also remains poorly estimated when it is allowed 
                                                           
26 A rationale is that at the onset of a recession plans are already set and the entire burden of adjustment is 
on actual investment (Ii,t), while later plans (I
Plan
i,t|t-1) may also be revised, thus mitigating the impact on the 
left-hand-side variable in (3).       19 
to be time-varying or when RAT is interacted with the contraction dummy (not shown in the 
tables). 
One possible explanation of this finding is that the investment plans in the survey are 
formulated before the financial constraints relevant to their implementation arise, and that 
the probability of future credit restrictions - RATt+1|t,  for which RATt is a proxy in equation 
(1) - mostly depends on firm-specific and time-invariant characteristics, and is therefore 
already captured by the firm individual fixed effects.
27 In favour of this conjecture, when 
fixed effects are excluded, the coefficient on RATt becomes once more mildly significant, as 
shown in the random effects estimate in the last column of Table 5.  
4.2 Group membership and the effects of credit availability 
The results reported in the previous section show that quantitative credit constraints 
have a large effect on the realisation of individual investment decisions when the economy is 
in contraction, but a much less significant impact in other periods. As mentioned in the 
introduction, there is a straightforward interpretation of this finding: during contractions, 
when the agency cost of external finance is large, it becomes more difficult for a firm to find 
substitutes for bank lending: alternative sources of finance, such as internal funds, recourse 
to financial markets, use of intra-industrial group liquidity, recourse to commercial credit 
lines, which are available to some firms in normal times, dry up when the economy enters a 
recession. 
If  this  interpretation  is  correct,  one  can  expect  that i)  on  average, the  response of 
investment realisations to changes in the availability of bank credit is weaker for those firms 
that have easier access to non-bank funding, and ii) the previous conclusion is, however, 
attenuated during recessions, when most non-bank sources of funding are also likely to dry 
up.  
We then construct a further test, splitting the sample according to a measure of a firm’s 
access to non-bank finance, to see how this affects our results both on average and across the 
cycle. For this purpose, we consider whether the firm belongs to an industrial group or not. 
                                                           
27 In the sample, the probability of current rationing is only weakly correlated to past rationing. Based on 
simple correlations, rationing in t increases the probability of rationing in t+1 by 30%; however, this estimate is 
reduced to 4% if controls for individual fixed effects are included.     20 
This measure has been widely used in the literature as a measure of bank-dependence; it has 
the  important  advantage  of  being  largely  exogenous  and  not  giving  rise  to  the  severe 
identification problems that plague the research on the credit channel. Alternative measures 
of credit constraints that could be derived from the balance sheet (liquidity ratios, cash flows, 
dividend policy, interest payments over operating margins, recourse to commercial credit, to 
name  a  few)  have  generally  been  shown  to  be  problematic  and  potentially  affected  by 
inverse causality.  
As argued in the literature, participation in a group would normally allow the firm to 
access inter-company funds through the holding company, which in turn has easy access to 
capital markets. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) show that in Japan firms affiliated to 
a group do a significant fraction of their borrowing from the banks in their group, which 
reduces their cost of capital. The literature has also shown that this advantage may be less 
relevant during an economic crisis. Lee, Park and Shin (2009) also find that active internal 
capital markets within Korean business groups (chaebols) attenuated the financial constraints 
of the group-affiliated firms during the early 1990s, but also that the functioning of internal 
capital markets was impaired by the financial crisis of 1997.  
In Italy, industrial groups represent an important phenomenon. The holding companies 
typically have access to reliable funding through large banks and operate an internal capital 
market for their group members. Bianco et al. (1999) find that investment by firms belonging 
to a group is less sensitive to cash flow than non-member firms. Guiso, Kashyap, Panetta 
and Terlizzese (1999) and Angelini and Generale (2008) argue that group membership is a 
proxy for firms that are less susceptible to a bank credit crunch.  
In the SIM, group membership can be identified directly since 1994, and indirectly in 
the previous years. In our sample, a quite large share of firms, around 55% on average, 
declares affiliation to a group. This figure is upward biased due to the under-representation 
of small firms; if we correct for the latter, using appropriate sample weights, the proportion 
of firms belonging to a group is 31%, a figure is broadly in line with those reported by other 
authors who use samples that include very small firms.
28  
                                                           
28 Bianco, Ferri and Finaldi Russo (1999) report that 29% of firms in their dataset belong to a group. 
Angelini and Generale (2008) report a figure of over 20%.      21 
We  split  the  sample  between  group  members  and  non-members  and  re-estimate 
equation (2). A priori, we expect that the (negative) coefficient b5 in equation (2) is low for 
members but large (in absolute value) for non-members; but also that during contraction 
periods b5 also becomes large (in absolute value) for group members, since the availability 
of within-group liquidity shrinks when the economy enters a recession. 
The results are shown in Table 6. For each regression, the sample is split between 
group members and non-members, with coefficients reported respectively in the first and in 
the second column. Four regressions are reported. 
The first two regressions replicate the benchmark equation shown in Table 3 above, 
with quantity credit restrictions measured alternatively by our preferred measure (RAT, first 
regression) or by the stricter definition (RAT_STRICT, second regression). The results lend 
some support to our conjecture. On average only for non-group members the point estimates 
of coefficient b5 are statistically significant and around -0.12 and -0.24 (respectively, when 
RAT and RAT_STRICT is used). By contrast, the point estimates of the same coefficient for 
group  members  are  about  half  that  size  (-0.07  and  -0.10)  and  either  not  statistically 
significant (in the first regression) or very weakly so (in the second regression).  
The  third  and  fourth  regressions  include  an  interaction  of  the  RAT  (alternatively 
RAT_STRICT) variable with the dummy identifying the first year of a contraction period 
(CONTRACTION_FIRST_YEAR), similarly to what was done in Table 4 above. The results 
are also consistent with our conjecture. During contractions, the coefficient b5 is large and 
strongly significant both for group members  (-0.24 and -0.30) and for non-members (-0.20 
and  -0.16).  By  contrast,  in  non-contraction  years,  only  the  coefficient  for  non-group 
members  remains  large  and,  at  least  when  the  RAT_STRICT  definition  is  used,  strongly 
significant; for group members, it reaches low and non-significant values.
29  
According to these results, it is mostly the behaviour of group members (who normally 
have access to alternative sources of finance) that drives the cyclical pattern of the effect of 
bank  credit  constraints  found  in  the  previous  section:  they  are  only  sensitive  to  the 
availability  of  bank  credit  in  bad  times,  when  alternative  sources  of  finance  dry  up.  In 
                                                           
29  For  group  members  the  difference  in  the  estimates  for  coefficient  b5  between  contraction  and  non-
contraction periods is  significantly different from zero (test not shown in the table).      22 
contrast, the investment of firms not belonging to a group always responds to bank credit 
restrictions. 
4.3 The global crisis in 2008-09 
Having concluded that credit restrictions have a large effect on the implementation of 
individual investment decisions when the economy is in contraction, and that this outcome 
may depend on the changing availability of alternative sources of finance, we now turn to a 
more  specific  assessment  of  the  role  of  credit  availability  in  the  global  recession, 
concentrating  on  the  years  2008-09.    In  addition  to  the  results  already  included  in  the 
previous section, we exploit a set of specific pieces of information on the financial crisis 
which was included in the 2008 edition of the SIM.  
In addition to the standard question on credit restrictions, in 2008 the firms were asked 
whether in the last part of the year, namely since October 2008, the banks recalled their 
existing credit lines; 13% of the respondents answered affirmatively.
30 This variable offers a 
different dimension of credit tightening than RAT: a recall of outstanding credit lines is a 
relatively less common, and potentially more disruptive, event for a firm than the denial of a 
new loan application.
31 In addition, the timing of the question (i.e. ‘since October 2008’) 
links the tightening to the Lehman collapse and to the sudden freeze in international financial 
markets in the last quarter of the year, supplying a measure of the credit restrictions that can 
be directly attributed to an exogenous and unexpected credit event, specific to the global 
crisis. 
Table 7a shows the characteristics of the firms whose bank loans were recalled in the 
last quarter of 2008, compared with the whole sample. On average, these firms were slightly 
smaller, less profitable, had a lower current and expected cash flow, more idle capacity and 
more uncertain prospects on their future sales growth: i.e. they were either firms in worse 
current conditions or firms more affected by uncertainty and asymmetric information. 
In 2008 the SIM also included additional qualitative questions on the impact of the 
global crisis on individual firms. These are important controls in our regression, in order to 
                                                           
30 In the following year’s survey, a similar question on credit line recalls in 2009 was repeated; 11% of the 
respondents still answered affirmatively. 
31 In fact, the responses to the two questions are also only very imperfectly correlated in the sample.     23 
avoid a spurious correlation between strictly financial factors and the broader impact of the 
global crisis on the firm that could produce biased estimates. Firms were asked how much 
they were affected by the crisis (admissible answers were: not at all, a little, considerably, 
very much) and for how long they expected to remain affected (as a maximum duration in 
months).
32  
We  estimate  two  augmented  versions  of  equations  (2)  and  (1).  In  addition  to  the 
regressors already discussed,  the specifications include a dummy equal to 1 for firms whose 
credit lines were recalled after the collapse of Lehman (CREDIT_LINE_RECALL), an index 
measuring  the  depth  of  the  crisis,  as  perceived  by  the  firm  (CRISIS_IMPACT),  and  the 
maximum expected crisis duration in months (MAX_CRISIS_DURATION). The equations 
are estimated over the years 2008 and 2009 only, with a random-effects estimator;
33 the 
results are shown, respectively, in Tables 7 and 8. 
On investment realisations (equation 2), the main conclusion of the previous section 
still applies: firms which, according to RAT, were credit-constrained reduced their annual 
investment relative to plans by about 15%-17% (Table 7). The result is also robust to the 
simultaneous introduction of 339 dummies for (3-digit) sector and 95 province dummies 
(last two columns).  
As for the other variables, realised investment was negatively affected by the impact of 
the crisis on the firm (a unit increase of the CRISIS_IMPACT index, e.g. from “not at all” to 
“a little”, decreased the firm’s investment by 10%). Firms’ size seems also to have been a 
factor  contributing  to  the  investment  slowdown  in  2008-09:  larger  firms  reduced  their 
investment more than smaller firms. 
By contrast, the post-Lehman recall of loans by banks (CREDIT_LINE_RECALL) did 
not impact on investment realisations, as shown by the statistically insignificant coefficient 
in the first row of the second and the fifth columns. A possible explanation is the following. 
Since the reported recall of credit lines by the banks occurred in the last quarter of 2008, it is 
unlikely that it could have affected the difference between investment realisations and plans 
(the dependent variable in Table 7), either in 2008 (at that time most investment decisions 
                                                           
32 For a discussion, see Bugamelli, Cristadoro and Zevi (2009). 
33 Since the crisis dummies are firm-specific, fixed effects cannot be included.     24 
for the year had probably already been implemented) or in 2009 (in that case, there was time 
to revise both plans and actual investment).  
However,  the  recall  of  credit  lines  showed  up  in  a  large  downward  revision  of 
investment plans in equation (1). As the regressions in Table 8 show, the coefficient on 
CREDIT_LINE_RECALL  is  negative  and  statistically  significant.  The  effect  is  also 
economically significant: the size of the coefficient implies that firms whose credit lines 
were  recalled  cut  their  investment/sales  ratio  by  around  0.5%  in  each  of  the  two  years 
covered by the regression. This broadly corresponds to a cut of 18% in plans each year by 
these firms.
34 
The estimates of the other coefficients in Table 8 are consistent with the hypotheses 
underlying the specification of the equation: plans responded positively and significantly to 
projected cash flow and projected sales, and negatively and significantly to uncertainty (as in 
Guiso and Parigi, 1999), to crisis and (at least in some regressions) to its expected duration.  
Based on these estimates, it is possible to quantify the magnitude of the effects of 
credit constraints on investment during the global crisis and to assess whether they were 
economically relevant. This is done in two steps. 
First, we consider the effect on investment plans for 2009 and for 2010. We run a 
counterfactual simulation of equation (1), assuming that CREDIT_LINE_RECALL is equal to 
0 for all firms; for each firm, we obtain the deviation from this counterfactual profile as 
*




t t i I I - - -  (an asterisk indicates counterfactual values). Then, we consider the effect of 
credit restrictions on investment realisations in 2008 and 2009, based on the estimates of 
equation  (2)  in  Table  7,  running  a  counterfactual  simulation  of  equation  (2)  under  the 
assumption that RAT is equal to 0 for all firms and obtaining for each firm the deviation from 
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Adding the two expressions, we obtain (
*
, , t i t i I I - ), i.e. the effect of credit restrictions 
on firm i’s investment. Aggregating across firms, the total impact on investment turns out to 
be  around  3.0%  in  each  of  the  three  years  2008-  2010,  corresponding  to  a  cumulate 
investment loss of 9.0% over the entire period. This estimated effect, which is in line with 
                                                           
34 In the sample investment plans by these firms were on average 2.8% of previous period’s sales,     25 
the assessment by Caivano, Rodano and Siviero (2010), is not negligible, although it only 
explains part of the downside pressure on investment over this period.
35  
5. Conclusions 
The evidence we have presented, covering around 1,200 Italian firms over the last 
twenty years, robustly supports the conjecture that, in addition to bank interest rates, credit 
quantities have a significant effect on investment. Our conclusion contrasts with the usually 
weak results found in much of the previous empirical literature. In particular, it improves on 
the existing results from studies at the Italian firm-level, such as Guiso and Parigi (1999) and 
Bontempi, Golinelli and Parigi (2010), which  typically have difficulty in finding statistical 
significance  of  the  effects.  We  are  able  to  reach  more  precise  estimates  thanks  to  two 
features of our approach.  
First, we concentrate on investment realisations, i.e. deviations from previous plans. It 
turns out that quantitative credit restrictions significantly and robustly affect the ex post 
realisation of investment plans; by contrast, it remains more difficult to identify a sizeable 
effect of credit availability on ex ante plans. As we argue in the paper, the latter difficulty 
may reflect some still unsolved problems of identification.   
Second, thanks to the features of our dataset, we test the conjecture that the effect of 
credit availability on investment is not constant over time, but depends on the state of the 
economy.  
We  find  that  the  impact  of  bank  credit  quantities  on  a  firm’s  investment  is  time-
varying and is concentrated in periods of contraction of economic activity, particularly at the 
beginning of a recession, when alternative sources of finance also dry up. The latter finding 
confirms a conjecture often advanced in the literature, but not systematically tested before. 
Based on specific information on the behaviour of firms that are members of an industrial 
group, we also find evidence supporting the conjecture that the availability of alternative 
non-bank sources of finance and its variations across the cycle are crucial to the results.  
                                                           
35  This  may  amount  to  between  one  fourth  and  one  fifth  of  total  pressure  on  investment  (excluding 
construction), measuring the latter as the decrease in investment that would have taken place assuming no 
compensating policy interventions. See the counterfactual simulations of the Bank of Italy Quarterly Model by 
Caivano, Rodano and Siviero (2010).     26 
The evidence presented also suggests that reduced credit availability played a non-
negligible role in contributing to the Great Recession in Italy, although the results do not 
suggest that it was the main driving force behind it. As in previous recessions, the increased 
share of firms that saw their applications for new loans turned down affected their ability to 
implement investment plans already decided. Moreover, a sudden recall of existing bank 
loans for a portion of firms, directly prompted by the market freeze soon after the collapse of 
Lehman  Brothers,  resulted  in  substantial  and  long-lasting  revisions  of  investment  plans, 
extending to 2010.  
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Source: SIM. Ratios of planned investment in t for t+1 and of actual investment in t to nominal sales in t-1; 
sample median. Shaded areas mark periods of economic contraction, based on the ISAE-ISCO dating. 
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Source: SIM. RAT_LOOSE=1: firms that would like more credit. RAT=1:  firms that would like more credit 
and have been denied credit by banks; RAT_STRICT=1:  firms that would like more credit, would be ready to 
pay a higher interest rate and have been denied credit by banks. Shaded areas mark periods of economic 
contraction, based on the ISAE-ISCO dating. 
 
 








   STATS |  INV_REV   INV_PLAN  CAP_UTIL PROFIT  EXP_D_OUTPUT  UNCERT   C_FLOW  EXP_C_FLOW 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    MEAN |  .1827424  .0396465  79.60158  2.608943  3.934921  8.996397  .0659967  .0634163 
     P10 | -.6387097  .0063588        63         1        -9         2         0         0 
     P50 | -.0372222  .0289284        80         3       2.4         6  .0461066  .0426692 
     P90 |     1.136  .0895522        95         4      16.6        20  .1583211  .1515152 
      SD |  1.026373  .0350891  13.13478  1.148666   18.2247  16.36858  .0833819  .0789405 
       N |     21921     27098     30112     21135     17048     12694     12921     12932 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Definitions:  INV_REV:  ratio  of  actual  investment  in  t  to  investment  plans  (formulated  in  t-1),  minus  1. 
INV_PLAN: investment plans (for t+1, formulated in t) as a ratio to nominal sales in t-1; CAP_UTIL: degree of 
capacity  utilisation,  as  %;  PROFIT:  index  for  firm’s  profitability  (ranging  from  1  to  5,  see  text); 
EXP_D_OUTPUT: expected % change in sales, in real terms, in t for year t+1; UNCERT: min-max range of the 
firm’s expectations for the previous variable; C_FLOW: current cash flow, as a ratio to nominal sales in t-1; 
EXP_C_FLOW: expected cash flow for the following year, as a ratio to nominal sales in t-1. 
 
 
     year |  RAT_LOOSE    RAT    RAT_STRICT 
----------+------------------------------ 
     1988 |  .0805687  .0203874  .0071356 
     1989 |  .0812721  .0263425  .0040527 
     1990 |  .0746606  .0250501   .009018 
     1991 |  .1003168  .0418367  .0306122 
     1992 |  .1244344  .0730159  .0412698 
     1993 |   .167982  .1104034  .0583864 
     1994 |  .1196172  .0707291   .039173 
     1995 |  .0915254  .0489362  .0212766 
     1996 |  .0678643  .0235849  .0084906 
     1997 |   .065723  .0249501   .006986 
     1998 |  .1005076  .0300601  .0180361 
     1999 |  .0929603  .0246696  .0176211 
     2000 |  .1073919  .0366102  .0216949 
     2001 |   .116061  .0412663  .0316563 
     2002 |  .1242906  .0448164  .0296976 
     2003 |  .1273637  .0540682  .0346457 
     2004 |  .1252796  .0458095  .0270692 
     2005 |  .0948787  .0302564  .0179487 
     2006 |  .1024636  .0236842  .0126316 
     2007 |  .1055363  .0264579  .0172786 
     2008 |  .1658031  .0924092  .0566557 
     2009 |  .1444632  .0790802  .0510376 
----------+------------------------------ 
    Total |  .1118017  .0453972  .0265675 
----------------------------------------- 
 
Source: SIM. Sample mean. RAT_LOOSE: share of firms that would like more credit; RAT: share of firms that 
would like more credit and have been denied credit by banks; RAT_STRICT: share of firms that would like 
more credit, would be ready to pay a higher interest rate and have been denied credit by banks.      30 
TABLE 1A 
 






no. of employees 576.8 338.1 566
profit index 2.64 1.79 2.61
cash flow/sales 0.066 0.061 0.066
expected cashflow/sales 0.64 0.061 0.063
capacity utilisation (%) 79.8 74.5 79.6
expected sales growth (%) 3.86 5.42 3.93
uncertainty 8.86 11.75 8.99
share belonging to a group (%) 55.5 49.9 55.3
# of firms 28745 1367 30112
 
Source: SIM. The profit index may range from 0 to 5. The uncertainty index is the min-max range of expected 




INVESTMENT AND CREDIT CONSTRAINTS / I 
 
 
INV_REV INV_REV INV_REV INV_REV INV_REV INV_REV INV_REV
RAT -0.09 (**) -0.10 (*) -0.08 -0.06 -0.11 (**)





CAP_UTIL  0.26 (**) 0.27 (**) 0.15 0.28 (**) 0.23 (**) 0.33 (**) 0.26 (**)
3.38 2.66 1.02 3.32 2.16 4.40 3.34
CFLOW -0.05
0.25
PROFIT 0.02 (*) 0.03 (**) 0.02 (*)
1.74 2.35 1.75
dummy delivery times (+) 0.11 (**) 0.09 -0.02 0.10 (*) 0.07 0.10 (*) 0.11 (*)
1.92 1.20 0.26 1.84 0.96 1.72 1.95
dummy delivery times (-) -0.15 (**) -0.16 (**) -0.16 (**) -0.13 (**) -0.14 (**) -0.15 (**) -0.15 (**)
7.35 5.50 3.35 5.09 4.22 7.14 7.34
dummy capital goods prices (+) 0.13 (**) 0.12 (*) 0.06 (**) 0.11 (*) 0.08 0.12 (**) 0.13 (**)
2.55 1.79 0.81 1.89 1.21 2.28 2.55
dummy capital goods prices (-) -0.21 (**) -0.22 (**) -0.24 (**) -0.19 (**) -0.21 (**) -0.22 (**) -0.21 (**)
5.31 4.41 3.16 4.10 3.56 5.43 5.36
dummy cash flow (+) 0.36 (**) 0.31 (**) 0.12 0.37 (**) 0.31 (**) 0.37 (**) 0.36 (**)
5.50 3.47 1.09 5.30 3.22 5.54 5.53
dummy cash flow (-) -0.30 (**) -0.27 (**) -0.27 (**) -0.29 (**) -0.28 (**) -0.29 (**) -0.30 (**)
11.58 8.45 5.53 9.64 7.12 11.27 11.52
dummy reorganisation (+) 0.68 (**) 0.70 (**) 0.70 (**) 0.68 (**) 0.70 (**) 0.69 (**) 0.68 (**)
29.61 24.54 18.14 28.51 23.53 29.63 29.63
dummy reorganisation (-) -0.45 (**) -0.48 (**) -0.54 (**) -0.45 (**) -0.48 (**) -0.45 (**) -0.45 (**)
34.75 28.43 21-16 29,91 25.08 33.54 34.78
2-digit sector *time no no no yes yes no no
Province *time no no no yes yes no no
time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
individual fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
obs 21921 15441 8892 21915 15435 20859 21921
R2 within 0.1775 0.1858 0.1788 0.2813 0.2815 0.1837 0.1778
period 1989-2009 1996-2009 2003-2009 1989-2009 1996-2009 1989-2009 1989-2009
 
Fixed effects estimator. (**): significance at 5%; (*): significance at 10%. For the definition of the main 
variables, see footnote to Table 1.     32 
TABLE 3 
 
INVESTMENT AND CREDIT CONSTRAINTS / II 
 





RAT*1991 0.29 0.56 (**)
1.10 2.07
RAT*1992 -0.25 (**) -0.24 (**)
2.45 1.91




RAT*1995 -0.33 (*) -0.28
1.88 1.45
RAT*1996 -0.11 -0.40 (**) -0.10 -0.36 (*)
0.71 2.19 0.54 1.69
RAT*1997 0.17 0.21 0.23 0.26
0.88 0.98 1.02 1.13
RAT*1998 0.17 0.09 0.25 0.14
0.64 0.36 0.96 0.63
RAT*1999 -0.34 (*) -0.34 (**) -0.16 -0.21
2.41 2.50 1.20 1.54
RAT*2000 -0.30 (**) -0.30 (**) -0.38 (**) -0.34 (**)
2.97 2.88 2.69 2.13
RAT*2001 0.17 0.11 0.09 0.06
0.72 0.47 0.40 0.26
RAT*2002 -0.18 -0.18 -0.14 -0.13
1.30 1.22 0.87 0.78
RAT*2003 -0.15 -0.17 -0.21 -0.24
1.18 1.19 1.42 1.58
RAT*2004 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.13
0.62 0.75 0.68 0.64
RAT*2005 -0.17 -0.17 -0.06 -0.10
1.10 1.02 0.32 0.50
RAT*2006 0.06 -0.04 0.05 -0.02
0.37 0.25 0.34 0.10
RAT*2007 0.03 0.01 0.16 0.12
0.21 0.06 0.87 0.68
RAT*2008 -0.14 (**) -0.17 (**) -0.20 (**) -0.27 (**)
2.19 2.45 2.38 3.14
RAT*2009 -0.16 (*) -0.17 (*) -0.14 -0.16
1.75 1.69 1.35 1.47
CAP_UTIL  0.25 (**) 0.26 (**) 0.27 (**) 0.23 (**)
3.33 2.64 3.27 2.18
PROFIT 0.02 (*) 0.02 (*)
1.80 1.81
dummy delivery times (+) 0.11 (**) 0.09 0.11 (**) 0.07
3.33 1.28 3.27 1.00
dummy delivery times (-) -0.15 (**) -0.15 (**) -0.13 (**) -0.15 (**)
7.37 5.43 5.08 4.14
dummy capital goods prices (+) 0.13 (**) 0.12 (*) 0.11 (*) 0.08
2.56 1.80 1.88 1.21
dummy capital goods prices (-) -0.21 (**) -0.23 (**) -0.19 (**) -0.21 (**)
5.24 4.41 4.03 3.55
dummy cash flow (+) 0.36 (**) 0.31 (**) 0.37 (**) 0.31 (**)
5.50 3.47 5.28 3.23
dummy cash flow (-) -0.30 (**) -0.27 (**) -0.29 (**) -0.27 (**)
11.49 8.45 9,61 7.08
dummy reorganisation (+) 0.68 (**) 0.70 (**) 0.68 (**) 0.70 (**)
29.54 24.54 28.50 23.55
dummy reorganisation (-) -0.45 (**) -0.47 (**) -0.45 (**) -0.48 (**)
34.78 28.41 29.97 25.10
2-digit sector *time no no yes yes
Province *time no no yes yes
time fixed effects yes yes yes yes
individual fixed effects yes yes yes yes
obs 21921 15441 21915 15435
R2 within 0.1778 0.1866 0.2827 0.2824
period 1989-2009 1996-2009 1989-2009 1989-2009
 
Fixed effects estimator. (**): significance at 5%; (*): significance at 10%. For the definition of variables, see 
footnote to Table 1.     33 
TABLE 4 
 
INVESTMENT AND CREDIT CONSTRAINTS / III 
 
INV_REV INV_REV INV_REV INV_REV
RAT*contraction -0.18 (**) -0.18 (**)
4.76 3.98
RAT*contraction_first_year -0.19 (**) -0.28 (**)
3.20 3.69
RAT*nocontraction 0.05 -0.07 0.14 (*) -0.06
0.70 1.31 1.88 0.95
CAP_UTIL  0.26 (**) 0.27 (**) 0.27 (**) 0.23 (**)
3.35 2.67 3.29 2.18
PROFIT 0.02 (*) 0.02 (*)
1.75 1.77
dummy delivery times (+) 0.11 (**) 0.09 0.11 (*) 0.07
1.94 1.20 1.86 0.95
dummy delivery times (-) -0.15 (**) -0.16 (**) -0.13 (**) -0.15 (**)
7.34 5.48 5.11 4.21
dummy capital goods prices (+) 0.13 (**) 0.12 (*) 0.10 (*) 0.08
2.50 1.79 1.83 1.22
dummy capital goods prices (-) -0.21 (**) -0.22 (**) -0.19 (**) -0.21 (**)
5.29 4.41 4.07 3.54
dummy cash flow (+) 0.36 (**) 0.32 (**) 0.37 (**) 0.32 (**)
5,51 3.50 5.30 3.26
dummy cash flow (-) -0.29 (**) -0.27 (**) -0.29 (**) -0.27 (**)
11.53 8.43 9.58 7.06
dummy reorganisation (+) 0.68 (**) 0.70 (**) 0.68 (**) 0.70 (**)
29.66 24.54 28.56 23.53
dummy reorganisation (-) -0.45 (**) -0.47 (**) -0.45 (**) -0.48 (**)
34.76 28.41 29.94 25.09
2-digit sector *time no no yes yes
Province *time no no yes yes
time fixed effects yes yes yes yes
individual fixed effects yes yes yes yes
obs 21921 15441 21915 15435
R2 within 0.178 0.1859 0.2821 0.2818
period 1989-2009 1996-2009 1989-2009 1989-2009
 
Fixed effects estimator. (**): significance at 5%; (*): significance at 10%. For the definition of the main 
variables, see footnote to Table 1.Contraction: dummy taking the value 1 in contraction years, according to the 
ISAE-ISCO dating. Contraction_first_year: dummy taking value 1 in the first year of a contraction, according 
to the ISAE-ISCO dating. Nocontraction: dummy taking alternatively the value 1-contraction (in the 1
st and 3
rd 
columns) and 1-contraction_first_year (in the 2
nd and 4
th columns).       34 
 TABLE 5 
 
PLANNED INVESTMENT AND CREDIT CONSTRAINTS 
 
 
INV_PLAN INV_PLAN INV_PLAN INV_PLAN INV_PLAN INV_PLAN INV_PLAN (1)
RAT -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 (*)
0.75 1.29 0.75 0.71 1.16 0.95 1.86
CAP_UTIL  0.015 (**) 0.007 (*) 0.015 (**) 0.012 (**)
6.30 1.71 5.84 5.95
EXP_D_OUTPUT  0.01 (**) 0.01 (**) 0.01 (**) 0.01 (**)
5.16 3.75 4.71 4.16
EXP_CFLOW 0.02 (**) 0.04 (**) 0.02 (**) 0.02 (**)
2.74 3.81 2.64 2.82
PROFIT 0.003 (**) 0.003 (**) 0.002 (**) 0.002 (**)
6.60 5.28 6.09 5.48
UNCERTAINTY -0.14
1.33
2-digit sector *time no no no yes yes yes no
Province * time no no no no no yes no
time fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
individual fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes random effects
individual random effects no no no no no no yes
obs 27098 7509 5438 25490 7509 7504 27098
R2 0.0739 0.0629 0.0607 0.088 0.0889 0.188 0.0736
period 1988-2009 2003-2009 2003-2009 1988-2008 2003-2009 2003-2009 1988-2009
 
Fixed effects estimator, unless otherwise indicated. (1): Random effects estimator. (**): significance at 5%; (*): 




SAMPLE SPLIT: GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
 
RAT -0.12 (**) -0.07
2.10 1.36
RAT_STRICT -0.24 (**) -0.10 (*)
4.11 1.77




RAT_STRICT*contraction_first_year -0.30 (**) -0.16 (**)
2.89 2.30
RAT_STRICT*nocontraction -0.22 (**) -0.07
3.16 0.97
CAP_UTIL  0.38 (**) 0.21 (**) 0.37 (**) 0.21 (**) 0.38 (**) 0.21 (**) 0.37 (**) 0.21 (**)
3.23 2.31 3.17 2.29 3.25 2.30 3.17 2.30
dummy delivery times (+) 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.11
1.27 1.59 1.35 1.58 1.26 1.60 1.35 1.59
dummy delivery times (-) -0.21 (**) -0.11 (**) -0.22 (**) -0.11 (**) -0.22 (**) -0.11 (**) -0.21 (**) -0.11 (**)
5.69 5.18 5.69 5.18 5.70 5.21 5.69 5.19
dummy capital goods prices (+) 0.22 (**) 0.05 0.22 (**) 0.05 0.22 (**) 0.05 0.22 (**) 0.05
2.31 1.02 2.30 1.01 2.30 1.04 2.30 1.02
dummy capital goods prices (-) -0.35 (**) -0.13 (**) -0.35 (**) -0.13 (**) -0.35 (**) -0.13 (**) -0.35 (**) -0.13 (**)
5.04 2.95 5.11 2.98 4.98 2.95 5,10 2.97
dummy cash flow (+) 0.40 (**) 0.33 (**) 0.40 (**) 0.33 (**) 0.40 (**) 0.33 (**) 0.40 (**) 0.33 (**)
3.73 4.17 3.72 4.18 3.73 4.22 3.71 4.20
dummy cash flow (-) -0.33 (**) -0.27 (**) -0.33 (**) -0.27 (**) -0.33 (**) -0.27 (**) -0.33 (**) -0.26 (**)
6.93 9.65 6.88 9,63 6.90 9.64 6.88 9.64
dummy reorganisation (+) 0.75 (**) 0.62 (**) 0.75 (**) 0.62 (**) 0.75 (**) 0.62 (**) 0.75 (**) 0.62 (**)
20.56 22.02 20.57 22.04 20.57 22.01 20.57 22.05
dummy reorganisation (-) -0.53 (**) -0.42 (**) -0.53 (**) -0.42 (**) -0.53 (**) -0.42 (**) -0.53 (**) -0.42 (**)
24.49 26.00 24.31 26.03 24.31 26.01 24.30 26.00
time fixed effects yes yes yes yes
individual fixed effects yes yes yes yes
obs 21835 21835 21835 21835
R2 within 0.1815 0.1819 0.1818 0.1819
period 1989-2009 1989-2009 1989-2009 1989-2009
non-member member non-member member non-member member non-member member
INV_REV INV_REV INV_REV INV_REV
 
 
Fixed effects estimator. (**): significance at 5%; (*): significance at 10%. For the definition of the main 
variables, see footnote to Table 1. Contraction_first_year: dummy taking the value 1 in the first year of a 
contraction, according to the ISAE-ISCO dating. Group indicates the sub-sample of firms who are member of 
an industrial group. Nocontraction: dummy taking the value 1-contraction_first_year. 








LINE_RECALL=0 LINE_RECALL=1 total sample
no. of employees 407.14 279.6 391.2
profit index 2.57 1.69 2.46
cash flow/sales 0.066 0.045 0.063
expected cashflow/sales 0.053 0.038 0.051
capacity utilisation (%) 80.3 77.6 79.9
expected sales growth (%) -6.74 -6.42 -6.7
uncertainty 11.23 12.88 11.44
share belonging to a group (%) 58.3 58.7 58.4
# firms 1459 208 1667
 
 
Source: SIM. The profit index may range from 0 to 5. The uncertainty index is the min-max range of expected 
growth in sales (in percentage points).      37 
TABLE 7 
 
INVESTMENT AND CREDIT CONSTRAINTS IN 2008-09 
 
INV_REV INV_REV INV_REV INV_REV INV_REV INV_REV INV_REV INV_REV INV_REV INV_REV
RAT -0.15 (**) -0.14 (*) -0.13 (**) -0.16 (**) -0.16 (**) -0.17 (**) -0.14 (**) -0.14 (**) -0.15 (**) -0.14 (**)
2.29 1.85 1.93 2.91 2.66 3.23 2.40 2.43 1.88 1.99
CREDIT_LINE_RECALL 0.05 0.026
0.61 0.34
CAP_UTIL  0.04 0.07 -0.15 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 -0.29 (*) -0.29 (*) 0.28 0.00
0.24 0.38 0.80 0.68 0.60 0.54 1.69 1.71 0.01 1.56
CFLOW -0.16 -0.10 -0.30 -0.20 0.14
0.50 0.29 1.02 0.63 0.35
PROFIT 0.051 (**) 0.049 (**) 0.035 (**) 0.027 (*) 0.029 (*) 0.012 0.013 0.048 (**) 0.081
2.97 2.75 2.07 1.78 1.87 0.81 0.83 2.43 1.05
SIZE  -42.90 (**) -66.10 (**) -47.70 (**) -30.06 (**) -47.50 (**) -22.80 (**) -34.90 (*) -35.10 (**) -37.50 (**) -27.90 (**)
2.84 5.18 2.73 2.77 4.64 2.74 2.75 2.81 2.64 2.06
CRISIS_IMPACT -0.12 (**) -0.10 (**) -0.09 (**) -0.08 (**)
3.98 3.78 3.68 2.68
MAX_CRISIS_DURATION 0.00 0.00 (*)
1.06 1.11
dummy delivery times (+) -0.08 -0.06 -0.13 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 (*)
0.45 0.33 0.71 0.31 0.30 0.23
dummy delivery times (-) -0.21 (**) -0.21 (**) -0.18 (**) -0.19 (**) -0.19 (**) -0.18 (**)
3.56 3.48 3.31 3.19 3.18 2.09
dummy capital goods prices (+) 0.15 0.10 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.12
1.03 0.67 1.31 1.16 1.16 0.77
dummy capital goods prices (-) -0.10 -0.08 -0.09 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11
1.50 1.08 1.42 1.58 1.54 1.22
dummy cash flow (+) 0.84 (**) 0.84 (**) 0.85 (**) 0.83 (**) 0.84 (**) 0.82 (**)
12.12 11.82 12.83 12.05 12.07 11.37
dummy cash flow (-) -0.54 (**) -0.54 (**) -0.53 (**) -0.54 (**) -0.53 (**) -0.55 (**)
17.80 17.46 19.00 17.59 17.72 13.41
dummy reorganisation (+) 0.24 0.22 0.25 (*) 0.26 (*) 0.26 (*) 0.26 (*)
1.59 1.43 1.70 1.74 1.74 1.74
dummy reorganisation (-) -0.28 (**) -0.29 (**) -0.29 (**) -0.27 (**) -0.27 (**) -0.28 (**)
6.32 6.20 7.17 6.19 6.22 4.30
Random fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
3-digit sector dummy no no no no no no no no yes yes
Province dummy no no no no no no no no yes yes
obs 2473 2327 2458 2473 2327 2667 2458 2458 2472 2457
R2 0.0081 0.0093 0.0155 0.2037 0.2085 0.2011 0.2125 0.2121 0.1242 0.3041
 




PLANNED INVESTMENT AND CREDIT CONSTRAINTS IN 2008-09 
 
INV_PLAN INV_PLAN INV_PLAN INV_PLAN INV_PLAN INV_PLAN INV_PLAN INV_PLAN INV_PLAN INV_PLAN INV_PLAN INV_PLAN
RAT  -0.0008
0.36
CREDIT_LINE_RECALL  -0.0046 (**) -0.0051 (*) -0.0045 (**) -0.0046 (**) -0.0050 (**) -0.0046 (**) -0.0043 (*) -0.0053 (**) -0.0050 (**) -0.0040 (**) -0.0044 (**)
2.36 2.41 2.11 2.45 2.50 2.06 1.95 2.64 2.25 1.98 2.32
CAP_UTIL
EXP_D_OUTPUT 0.79 (**) 0.80 (**) 0.76 (**) 0.78 (**)
2.65 2.61 2.43 2.59
EXP_CFLOW 0.06 (**) 0.06 (**) 0.08 (**) 0.05 (**) 0.06 (**) 0.06 (**) 0.08 (**) 0.06 (**) 0.06 (**) 0.08 (**) 0.06 (**) 0.05 (**)
4.79 4.68 4.75 4.26 5.10 4.11 4.76 4.04 4.28 5.01 4.69 4.05
PROFIT 0.22 (**) 0.20 (**) 0.14 (**) 0.21 (**) 0.06 (**) 0.14 (**) 0.15 (**) 0.16 (**) 0.19 (**) 0.20 (**) 0.21 (**) 0.20 (**)
4.19 3.68 2.52 4.54 5.10 2.61 2.54 2.64 3.25 3.32 3.85 3.59
INCERT  -1.43 -1.28 (**) -1.81 (**) -1.70 (**) -1.39 (**) -2.00 (**)
2.30 2.07 2.87 2.73 2.25 3.20
CRISI_IMPACT -0.19 (**) -20.18 (**) -25.29 (**) -24.89 (**) -31.17 (**) -30.45 (**) -20.14 (**) -19.03 (**)
2.11 2.18 2.44 2.55 2.82 2.89 2.10 2.14
MAX_ CRISIS_DURATION  0.00 0.20 -1.50 -1.21 -1.57 (**) -0.94 -0.78 -0.35 -1.98 (*) 2.14 (**) -1.31 -0.13
0.12 1.03 1.33 1.60 2.00 0.85 0.67 0.30 1.91 1.98 0.01 0.14
SIZE 1.60 1.29 1.98 (**)
1.09 1.54 2.17
Firm random effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
2-digit sector dummy no no no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
Province dummy no no no no yes no yes yes yes no yes no
obs 2154 2086 1487 2501 2494 1487 1482 1482 1487 1482 2081 2086
R2 0.0484 0.0521 0.0648 0.0927 0.1053 0.11 0.1491 0.1902 0.1053 0.1424 0.1148 0.0997
 
(**): significance at 5%; (*): significance at 10%. For the definition of the main variables, see footnote to Table 1. 
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